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Introduction
No contemporary cultural critic cuts as comic a figure as Slavoj Žižek. As John Milbank has 
recently remarked, “Somewhat like the tragicomic, clown-like Christ he sometimes invokes, he 
stands before us without the least vestige of pretence, revealing every last symptom of his quirky 
subjectivity, whilst always allowing this to witness to the universal.” (Milbank 2009: 111). Such a 
description not only characterizes Žižek, it also serves as a description of the comic process itself 
as recently articulated by Alenka Zupančič: “comedy is the universal at work” (Zupančič 2008: 27). 
According to Zupančič, and for reasons to be explained later, this form of comedy contains a more 
radically “subversive edge” (Zupančič 2008: 33), thus lending itself to Žižek’s critical ambition to re-
actualise the Left as a radical political force. Zupančič and Žižek are not the first to employ comedy 
for its politically subversive edge, nor articulate comic theory in terms of its politically transgressive 
character, although rarely has such a theory of comedy drawn so explicitly upon a theological 
framework, whilst offering some key challenges to theology. This paper is an attempt to outline and 
critically evaluate Zupančič and Žižek’s comic revolt in the light of its theological implications, as 
well as offer a theological alternative to understanding the comic process in the light of that 
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evaluation.
I begin by making the case for a genealogical approach to comedy. Seen from the 
perspective of power, many of the finest critics of comedy, including Bahktin are shown to operate 
with an implicit anti-theological bias in their work. In particular, they elide the place of comedy 
within the Christian Middle Ages. This occlusion of Christian sources is coupled with a further 
ideological form which views the function of comedy in wholly social terms as opposed to say that 
of the soul and its elevation. 
In the second section I turn to an appreciation of Zupančič and Žižek’s work on comedy. 
Their argument is simple. Comedy has traditionally occupied the ground of materialism, mocking 
lofty aspirations: the particular usurps the universal. By contrast their Hegelian approach identifies 
the moment of comedy with the incarnation: the coincidence of the universal with the particular, 
which divests itself of all metaphysical conceit, whilst refusing the reductionism of the materialist 
approach.  
In the third section I assess their contribution from the perspective of theology. As I argue, 
despite their theological leanings, their theory remains trapped within the secular assumptions of 
modernity, maintaining much of the anti-theological bias of previous comic theory. 
In the fourth section I introduce an alternative framework for comic appreciation: the 
medieval paradigm of analogy and participation, generally associated with St Thomas Aquinas, 
and recently championed by John Milbank. Articulating comedy in this way, I argue, avoids the twin 
reductions of religion to either the liberal private interior, or the sphere of the purely social, and 
thereby offers a genuinely critical reading of comic subjectivity. From this perspective the radical 
edge to comedy is not so much the divestment of metaphysics per se, but the refusal of the 
particular form of metaphysical presuppositions that shape Zupančič and Žižek’s secular outlook: 
the doctrine of univocity. 
In the fifth section I offer up both G.K. Chesterton and Søren Kierkegaard as contemporary 
critics who, as I argue, employed less a dialectical and more an analogical framework for comedy. 
In this way I question Žižek’s reading of these theologians and his materialist appropriation of 
them.
In conclusion, I suggest that Zupančič and Žižek are right to identify the critical edge to 
comic subjectivity with the incarnation, but that means taking the incarnation and its theological 
metaphysics seriously.
I: A genealogical take on comedy
 
By way of situating this debate it is helpful to reflect briefly, not on the history of comedy as such; 
e.g. its development from attic drama to canned laughter, but the meta-critical history of comic 
theory itself. What is required is a genealogy of comedy because a theory of comedy is never 
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simply a theory. Theory is itself culturally bound, so comic theories reflect something of the specific 
ideological imperatives at work within the given field. 
Bakhtin’s theory of the comic as festive liberation from social restraints offers a clear 
example of this. Where eighteenth and nineteenth century theories of laughter tended to denigrate 
as vulgar the corporeal and derogative humour of the Middle Ages – what Bakhtin called 
“grotesque realism” (Bakhtin 1968: 18) – Bakhtin himself sought its recovery, championing laughter 
as a cultural and political force: “the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract […] is a 
transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity” (Bakhtin 
1968: 19-20). This is the materlialist bent of his work: comedy recalls us to appreciate our 
contingent existence in the face of lofty idealism. Carnival comedy becomes therefore “an 
expression of rebellion aimed at religious authorities and their institutions” (Gilhus 1997: 104). The 
forms and rituals identified by Bakhtin are said to place laughter outside the life of the official 
Church;   the tone of official feasts are said to be “monolithically serious” and without the element 
of laughter” (Bakhtin 19 68: 9). The carnival by contrast is the people’s second life” (Bahktin 1968: 
8); laughter belonged to another world, a “folk culture” (Bakhtin 1968: 5), a disruption and 
challenge to the official feasts of the Middle Ages, which function to “sanction the existing pattern of 
things” (Bakhtin 1968: 9).
Much of the political thrust of Bakhtin’s work is curried through his continual and crude 
dichotomising of the traditions represented. Where laughter is now taken as “an individual reaction 
to some isolated event” (Bakhtin 1968, 11), the festive laughter of the Middle Ages celebrates the 
social body, a folk community ever growing through the cycle of seasons. As Gilhus points out, the 
argument is framed by a narrative mythology of the fall in which the golden age of pagan humour 
is lost in favour of Christian seriousness and hence “laughter becomes an expression of a salvific 
generative power” (Gilhus 1997: 105), a case of what Lacan might term joussiance.   
Bahktin’s work offered a welcome riposte to the age of reason, in which theories of laughter 
and comedy tended to subdue the body, and did much to encourage subsequent work, yet as 
Hokenson points out, Bakhtin “mutes the theological traditions behind much of the carnival history 
he is citing” (Hokenson 2006: 117; Bakhtin 198-199). For example, he readily “notes traces of 
Roman saturnalia in pagan humour as folk background, but neglects the doctrinal background of 
the Catholic Church, which sanctioned carnival.”  Bahktin sweeps it altogether as “folk humour’’ 
(Hokenson 2006: 117). Moreover, while Baktin held out that folk humour united “thought and body” 
(Bakhtin 1968: 48), in his aversion to modernity he still maintains the antithesis between reason 
and body. 
One may concur with Hokenson that “it may have been simply prudent under the Soviets to 
omit theological questions, and Bakhtin is clearly chaffing against Stalin’s authoritarian regime” 
(Hokenson 2006: 117), but this merely raises the more fundamental question as to the precise anti-
theological construction at the heart of modern comic theories. In other words, what if Bakhtin is 
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not simply obeying prudence as Hokenson suggests, but rather, carnival laughter is rendered a 
secular equivalent to religious laughter so while his work on laughter may be about the Middle 
Ages, it remains a product of 20th Century assumptions?  
Little wonder then that Bakhtin’s work sits comfortably with Harvey Cox’s self-proclaimed 
“companion piece” to The Secular City, The Feast of Fools (Cox 1969: vii) which takes a similar 
tack. Eliding the specificity of Catholic comedy in the Middle Ages he puts the festive play of the 
medieval tradition directly in the service of twentieth century protestant death-of-theology.
The point to take from this is not simply that we should recover the comic texts of the 
Middle Ages; medievalists have been doing a good job of that for some time now (Le Goff 1997); 
rather we need to redefine what we take as comic in the first place in such a way as to open the 
field to its religious and political potential. In the manner of Alexandra Koyre, it needs to be asked: 
what are the metaphysical presuppositions and shifts which facilitated the shift in comic theory so 
that it becomes avowedly anti-theological?
In order to clarify what is stake here, and support my argument, one may take a different 
but related approach. Consider for example the curious elision of medieval comedy from comic 
theory (Bakhtin notwithstanding). As Hokenson, in her magisterial study of comic theory puts it: 
Despite the work of anthropological critics on folk culture, and Bakhtin on medieval folk 
humour in general, through the twentieth century the typical new theory of comedy 
continued neglecting medieval comic texts. The critic’s continuum of literary history […] 
erased the Middle Ages with a nod. (Hokenson 2006: 146) 
She cites as examples George McFadden who dismisses centuries of Christian comic art when in 
Discovering the Comic he states “the comic theatre was revived during the Renaissance with 
astonishing fidelity to […] Roman times” (McFadden 1982: 57). Louis Cazamian, in a book written 
in the thirties which allies comedy to national/racial types, is more openly disparaging. In The 
Development of English Humour  he states that humour ‘hardly came into its own till the 
Renaissance; prior to that time the mental capacity which it requires was not very diffuse’ 
(Cazamian 1952: 4). Medieval humour was too derisive or vulgar and precluded the more complex 
laughter of what Hokenson calls “enlightenment tolerance” (Hokenson 2006: 146). 
The relation of comedy to the ideological imperative for tolerance is central here. What is at 
stake is not any given content of a joke, but that comic theory privileged those texts where a more 
egalitarian mode was perceived to be at work; hence the Aristotelian theory, revised by Hobbes, in 
which comedy entailed the denigration of a butt who served to strengthen the existing social 
structures found itself increasingly under fire. Much better the butt who was witty, than wit found at 
the expense of the butt. (Hokenson 2006: 67). If the comic of the middle-ages was elided then, it 
was because he or she presented a mode of challenge to a wider liberal consensus and value of 
egalitarianism. The logic runs something like this: religion was subversive; therefore either its 
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humour was denigrated and elided for sake of the social, or humour itself was established in 
opposition to religious authority.
Indeed, this might serve as one of the central thesis of Hokenson’s book although the 
argument is never explicitly spelled out. Instead, one of the principle foci of her book is the claim 
that “the comic mode is social; the comic stage is not the soul but the world […] Historically 
tragedy, epic, lyric, and other genres could all be ethical, metaphysical, even theological, but they 
were never primarily social” (Hokenson 2006: 17). This is what combines both the Aristotelian view 
with the modern. The Aristotelian superiority theory whereby “socio-moral values are posited as 
superior to the butt who comically deviates from them” (Hokenson 2006: 18) is situated within the 
social plane: the joke functions to support the law (much like the manner of the scapegoat as 
articulated by René Girard). Likewise, while modern critical reaction may have highlighted “the self-
serving discourse of the elite” that had underpinned the superiority view – championing instead the 
“underdog” as the comic hero who transgresses the law, it too remains within the social conception 
of comedy. In the former, one laughs at the comic protagonist, thereby reinforcing superior social 
values; in the latter one identifies with the comic protagonist, as if to satisfy “insurgent impulse to 
alter the social order” (Hokenson 2006: 24), hence Hokenson’s thesis. One might wager that 
approached genealogically, the omission of medieval comedy is testimony to the way in which the 
medieval text risked exploding both modernist assumption about the social paradigm and where 
religion stood in that regard. 
In sum, against the usual popularist claim that Christianity suppressed laughter (given 
notable expression in Umberto Eco’s  Il Nome della Rose), one should entertain the counter claim 
that it was the secular theorists of comedy that suppressed religious laugher: against the Christian 
confinement of the comic, one could make the case for the comic confinement of Christianity?  
II: Zupančič and Žižek on Comedy
All of this brings us to the post-modern comic theory presented by the so called Slovene-Lacan 
School; chiefly Alenka Zupančič and Slavoj Žižek. The former has worked extensively on comedy 
and her work is taken up – entirely appreciatively – by Žižek as his own, hence I shall have cause 
to refer to both Zupančič and Žižek’s theory at times, as well as refer to them individually.
Zupančič’s principle question concerns the following – whilst confirming the need for meta-
critical reflection on the theory of comedy: “it is rather amazing how […] comedy’s supposed 
celebration of human finitude often seems to be the principle argument when it comes to justifying 
serious theoretical or philosophical attention to this rather underrated genre” (Zupančič 2008: 48). 
Zupančič’s point is quite simple, and further serves to highlight the need for genealogical 
consideration: comedy is typically celebrated as a material imperative expressed in terms of the 
particular usurping the universal. For example, take philosophy’s first joke, put into the mouth of 
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Socrates by Plato in Theatetus: 
The jest which the clever witty Thracian is said to have made about Thales, when he fell 
into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said that he was so eager to know what 
was going on in heaven that he could not see what was before him. (Berger 1997: 15)  
How does this amount to a materialist view of comedy work?  The universal standpoint (i.e. the 
idealist’s heaven) is undermined by the particular and materialist standpoint. And it is this comic 
mode that Zupančič claims is silently assumed by the field. One can cite a number of examples in 
support of this contention. In Peter Berger’s Redeeming Laughter, he manages to sum up an entire 
chapter offering a historical overview of philosophical writing on comedy with the claim “the 
philosopher looks at the sky and falls in the hole” (Berger 1997: 35). Nathan Scott is explicit: 
comedy is governed by a “gross materialism” (Scott 1965: 110); and George Aichele makes the 
claim in Theology as Comedy that: 
comedy attacks whatever is partial biased, or narrow, especially when that particular 
viewpoint makes a claim to represent the whole. Theology may learn from comedy that 
such partial viewpoints are doomed to suffer from the barbs of the buffoon, whatever guise 
she may wear. (Aichele 1998: 103)
Zupančič calls the ideological field which governs such a reading: “the metaphysics of 
finitude” (Zupančič 2008: 48). In the first instance it is metaphysics because: the theory remains 
caught in the abstract dualism of the concrete and universal: “counterbalancing idealist escapades 
with the limitations posed by dense material reality” (Zupančič 2008:  47). So while on one level the 
joke offers identification with the concrete; it nonetheless leaves the universal “not only untouched, 
but even reinforced”. Or as she says a little later on: what is at stake is the 
mode of the comic processing itself […] the concrete (where “human weakness” are 
situated) remains external to the universal, and at the same time invites us to recognise 
and accept it as the indispensable companion of the universal, its necessary physical 
support. (Zupančič 2006: 182-183)
To highlight Zupančič’s point one might take the well known joke about a newly arrived in heaven: 
St. Peter is showing him around the various groups; the Jews, the Protestants, the 
Muslims, the Quakers. Then they come to large area surrounded by a high wall from behind 
which they could hear the sounds of voices and laughter: who is behind the wall asks the 
newly arrived to which St. Peter replies they are the Catholics, and they think they’re the 
only ones here.
On the one hand the joke ridicules the Catholic claim extra ecclesiam nulla salus: there is no 
salvation outside the Church (i.e. the Church’s claim to truth stands above all others), by way of 
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including the representation of different religious traditions (i.e. the particular) within heaven. 
However, on the other hand the joke leaves intact at the implicit level the very assumption of 
Catholic exclusivity to the extent it is still a Catholic heaven in which the others are included, just as 
the newcomer is still met by St Peter. In other words, while it ridicules aspects of Catholic belief, it 
does not critique Catholicism per se which is left unquestioned. It maintains its position as the big 
Other which determines the meaning of the field.   
The structural similarity to John Hick’s Sufi tale of the blind elephant further highlights this 
very point (and hence in contrast to its treatment within the philosophy of religion it should be taken 
literally as a joke). In the tale, three blind men – representative of the various religious traditions – 
are asked to feel and thereafter describe an elephant which has been set before them. Yet in doing 
so, each one only partially grasps the elephant. The first feels only the trunk; the second feels only 
the leg; the third feels only the tail. Employing the language of Kant, Hick posits this difference in 
terms of phenomena (the particular) and the noumena (the universal). The implication: each 
religion is a partial cultural manifestation of an undisclosed whole at the noumenal level. Yet the 
analogy relies precisely on the position of someone who can see; i.e. occupies a transcendental 
position which the very story appears to usurp (in the Sufi tale it is the king who gathers the blind 
men). Hence the materialism of jokes yields an implicit idealism, the metaphysics of comedy, 
producing a necessary difference to sustain the initial belief. This explains why Zupančič deems 
such a comic process “conservative”: they can “successfully promote the very ideology whose 
human side and weakness are being exposed” (Zupančič 2008: 33), remaining dogmatically 
metaphysical in a disguised fashion.
In the second instance comic theory presupposes finitude because finitude ultimately 
appears as “consolation for, and explanation of, our little (or not so little) disappointments and 
misfortunes” (Zupančič 2008: 48). The thrust of such comic intervention may be summed up thus: 
“we have to consider and accept the material, physical, concrete, and human aspect of things 
otherwise we will be carried into a dangerous abstract ideality, extremism, if not even fanaticism” 
(Zupančič 2008: 31). 
Yet such an approach as Žižek and Zupančič argue, fosters a certain resignation, because 
such a view is irresistibly driven towards pathos; we must accept “gap, a failure, defeat, non-
closure, as the ultimate horizon of human existence” thereby lending an “ultra-serious heroic 
confrontation with our destiny” – the very opposite of what we traditionally take as comedy (Žižek 
2006: 110).
It is tempting to call this paradigm of comedy Kantian (as distinct from a Kantian theory of 
comedy) for the reasons given above: it invites one to accept a certain epistemological humility in 
the face of an idealist claim; yet allows that idealist claim to remain intact; only out of sight, 
presupposed only empirically non-verifiable. By contrast Zupančič and Žižek’s comedy – what 
Zupančič terms the physics of infinity, rests on distinctly Hegelian suppositions. 
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This move to resuscitate a subversive comedy via Hegel1 may strike the reader as initially 
odd, yet as Zupančič highlights, Hegel introduces comedy in the Phenomenology under the sub-
heading “The Spiritual Work of Art”. The section concerns how art has represented the relation of 
the human to divine; i.e. the particular to the universal, which is detailed through an account of the 
passage through the three primary genera of drama identified by Hegel and Schelling: epic 
narrative, tragedy, and comedy. 
Epic narrative marks for Hegel the first time in which the relationship between the human 
and divine is presented to consciousness (Hegel 1977: 441; Zupančič 2008: 23). The medium is 
language, which Hegel associates with the universal, and the narrative takes shape through an 
individual, the minstrel. Hegel characterises the relation between the universal and the individual in 
this mode as “a synthetic combination” (Hegel 1977: 441) in which the universal remains external 
to the individual. For example, the actions of the gods in the narrative are identical to the actions of 
men and hence take on the character of individuals; yet at the same time 
they are no less the universal that withdraws itself from this connection, that remains 
unrestricted in its own specific character, and through the invincible elasticity of its unity 
effaces the atomistic singleness of the doer and his constructions, preserves itself in its 
purity and dissolves everything individual in its fluid nature. (Hegel 1977: 443)  
The following form of the spiritual work of art is dramatic tragedy. In tragedy, language is no 
longer the sole medium of representation; the heroes are not simply spoken about, but speak. The 
content of tragedy is not merely found in the representation of the gods, but in the actual speech 
and actions of the actors. However, the actor still re-present the gods through the use of a mask. 
Representation is a function of the relation of the mask to the actor. As Hegel says, “The hero who 
appears before the onlookers splits up into his mask and the actor, into the person in the play and 
the actual self.” (Hegel 1977: 450) Through the mask the actor represents the universal, and as 
such, the essence of the universal, with the actual self merely assigned to characters. This renders 
tragedy problematic in the same way as epic narrative: the relation of the universal to the concrete 
remains external: “The self-consciousness of the hero must step forth from his mask” (Hegel 1977: 
450). 
In the final spiritual work of art, comedy, representation is done away with all together. So 
As Hegel points out, if in tragedy the self-conscious individual represents the universality; in Greek 
comedy 
the actual self of the actor coincides with what he impersonates […] What this self-
consciousness beholds is that whatever assumes the form of essentiality over against it, is 
instead dissolved in it – in its thinking, its existence, and its action – and is at its mercy. 
(Hegel 1977: 452)  
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What is at stake in the above passage is not that the contingent is subsumed in the 
universal – but that the universal is utterly contingent. This is what Hegel means by the ‘Concrete 
Universal’. Hegel’s chapter piece on the most accomplished spiritual work of art is situated just 
before the chapter on revealed religion; in other words, the moment of comedy (as Kierkegaard 
also understood) borders the incarnation in which the universal appears directly as the individual. 
In this way Hegel makes Christianity the religion of comedy.
To clarify the distinctiveness of what is being introduced here one can point to the 
metaphysics underlying the Kantian joke – with the post-metaphysical Hegelian joke. If the former 
issues forth in a kind of moralising joke with its false humility - as in the case of the Christian 
ecumenist joke; a Hegelian joke runs more along the lines of the Marx Brothers’ famous quip: He 
may look like an idiot and talk like an idiot but don't let that fool you. He really is an idiot. Or, to give 
it a theological spin one might say of Christ: he may look like a man and act like a man but don’t let 
that fool you, he really is a man (and to follow it through: he may look like God and act like God but 
don’t be fooled, he really is God). This joke works by setting up the Kantian oppostion between the 
subject and the big Other – the particular and universal – leading one to believe in each case that 
the Other serves as the transcendental support (e.g. Christ may look like a man but in fact he is a 
God). Yet in the final instance the subject is forced to identify precisely as this Other (Christ is 
God), and in this way gives expression to its Lacanian counterpart: there is no Other of the other.
By way of clarification one may characterise the two comic universes presented here in the 
following ways:  In the former finitude is principally taken to imply a boundary or limit; in the latter, 
finitude is an “emphatic concept” (Zupančič 2008: 51). If the former comic universe is built within a 
horizon of immanence by closing off its finite self in relation to the infinite; the latter abandons the 
beyond and situates the Essence in a concretely existing situation; i.e. it includes it in the 
immanence of a given situation. If the former comedy “encloses itself within a heart-stirring 
humanism of acceptance and weakness claiming ultimately that: Man is Man; the later refuses 
such a materialist reduction: man is not a man” (Zupančič 2008: 50); and where the former issues 
in a politics of the possible (i.e. acceptance); the latter implies a politics of the impossible.
In sum then, Zupančič’s theory finds the comic mode not in the usual materialist critique of 
idealism; but the very point at which the ideal appears directly as the material, and it is this paradox 
– this incongruity – which generates the truly subversive comic mode of comedy; taking man not 
simply as not-infinite; but also not-finite; such that where before the spilt lay between the finite and 
the infinite, the contradiction is now inherent to the notion of finitude itself: the human condition is a 
contradiction that cannot be qualified as finite. 
All this serves the conceptual basis of Zupančič and Žižek’s ‘materialist theology’ – not in 
the crude sense of reducing life to its biological ground – the comic Spirit Zupančič tells us, “far 
from being reducible to this metaphysics of the finite, is, rather, always a ‘physics of the infinite” 
(Zupančič 2008: 50). And it is precisely this physics of the infinite which, ironically, situates comedy 
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on the ground of true materialism. It is ‘infinite’ because the contradiction involved in the human 
condition is a contradiction that cannot be qualified as finite, and it is 'physics' because this 
necessary contradiction is always materialized in finite objects and actions. In other words, its not 
that comedy is too material, always bringing us back to the ground, like Thales, who slipped whilst 
his gaze was fixed upon the heavens; rather, comedy exposes the way that despite being brought 
back down to the ground we carry on with our eyes fixed upon the heavens. When one reduces 
materiality to a realm of nature, it cannot account for the seeming self-transcendence of nature by 
consciousness: the moment of comedy; i.e. that human exists only in this kind of excess over-itself. 
Yet what is the precise nature of this ‘excess’ over human?
III: Critical Comedy? 
Here we encounter the anti-theological thrust of their work. As Zupančič argues, the excess of the 
inhuman over the human testifies to nothing more than the irreducible interplay of material and 
symbolic interaction; a creation or product of life’s own inherent contradiction: “Not only are we not 
infinite, we are not even finite” (Zupančič 2008: 53).  To employ William Desmond’s taxonomy as 
Frederiek Depoortere has done, one might call this an instance of “immanent transcendence”; in 
other words, it merely attests to a moment of self-transcendence within immanence and so 
continues the materialist tradition (Depoortere 2007:  500). Of course, this hardly warrants criticism 
to the extent this is precisely the position advocated by Zupančič and Žižek. My argument is that 
this move renders their theory of comedy no more radical than the preceding theories by leaving 
intact the wider ideological field governing the presuppositions of comic theory: the theory remains 
antagonistic to the theological paradigm.
By reducing the ‘inhuman excess’ to a sublime phenomenal manifestation of the real, 
Zupančič and Žižek confine God within the aesthetics of sublimity; i.e. a private experience. Yet as 
Milbank highlights, drawing on Kierkegaard’s initial insight: the sublime is the modern transcendent 
(Kierkegaard 1938: 346). The theory of the sublime within aesthetic discourse replaces medieval 
discussion of participated beauty; the sublime no longer refers to an encounter with God, rather, it 
becomes a purely aesthetic rendering of transcendence as the sublime (Milbank 1998: 258-283). 
Yet Western democracy relies on representation: if a thing cannot be represented in some manner; 
i.e. given a place within the symbolic, it has no political import. The reduction of religion to a private 
ineffability therefore conforms to the liberal consensus. 
For this reason, Zupančič and Žižek’s theory of comedy, while resisting the metaphysical 
thrust of comedy in favour of a Hegelian twist is precisely that: a further turn of the Kantian screw 
which intensifies the anti-theological and agnostic heart of modernity. Zupančič and Žižek’s work 
on comedy belongs within the same trajectory as the model they critique. 
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Approached another way, one might be tempted to suggest that their criticism is more aptly 
described as a critique of the role of metaphysics within the structuring of religious thought, which 
is not a criticism of religion per se. Hence when Zupančič states that ‘It is precisely this physics of 
the infinite that exempts Hegelian comedy “from all forms of spiritualism, and also gives it its 
contrareligious thrust” her point is not that she is “mocking the infinite Other, but rather, by 
deploying this infinite Other as the very material Real of human life as such” (Zupančič 2008: 50). 
Yet here we have a clear statement of intent: to redefine transcendence within asethetic 
categories. 
In both cases what gets lost is the alternative critical gesture of theology. What if comedy 
was (as Milbank might suggest), less dialectical and more metaxogical, or rather, in line with 
medieval thought, analogical and paradoxical?  By medieval I do not mean to look at medieval 
theories of comedy as such, but, taking up Milbank’s challenge to Žižek, offer an appreciation of 
how comedy might function according to the medieval paradigm of analogy. 
IV: Analogy and participation
To consider this we need first to clarify what is initially at stake between these two approaches: 
modernity. Here I rehearse the succinct restatement of Milbank’s project by Simon Oliver in The 
Radical Orthodoxy Reader. Broadly speaking, the advent of modernity may be located in a shift 
that took place within scholastic thought of the high medieval period. The transition from the 
medieval paradigm to the modern can be characterised as the transition from analogy and 
participation to univocity. How so? 
Generally speaking, this distinction arises in the context of philosophical reflection on the 
ways we speak about God. When it comes to this fundamental question, Aquinas was on the side 
of analogy and participation. He argued that we name God from creatures, because as effects, 
they resemble their causes in the manner of their character (this is the neo-Platonist strain within 
Aquinas) (Oliver 2009: 13). Of course, we cannot know God in the manner of a thing, because God 
is not reducible to a thing of the world; the creator cannot be reduced to an object of creation. Yet 
because God is the cause of creation, creation expresses something of its creator; so while there 
are reasons we cannot speak about God it is also the case that we cannot not speak about God. 
To speak analogically then is to infer both this likeness and unlikeness. It is not to speak univocally; 
i.e. positing terms of God in the same sense across diverse species. What it means to speak about 
God’s goodness is not the same as speaking about Bob’s goodness. Rather, the relation is one of 
analogy, or more specifically, the analogy of attribution. 
According to Aquinas, who starts from the presupposition of God’s simpleness, only God is 
existence himself: God’s existence is his essence. We have existence attributed to us by virtue of 
our relation to God in the same way that some foods are not healthy in and of themselves, but 
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merely by virtue of the fact they contribute to a human’s health. Likewise, human existence is due 
to the relation we share with the source of being: God. More particularly, and by way of drawing a 
distinction from the pantheistic undertones of this model, we are only in so far as we participate in 
the gratuity of God’s gift. Creation is not self-existence but has existence by virtue of God’s grace. 
Participation therefore assets that creation is real, but not as distinct from God, it is only real to the 
extent it participates, which is to receive itself as gift: the more we participate in God, the more 
human we become.
However, as Oliver contends, “In the generation following Aquinas, his analogical 
understanding of the relationship between God and creation was radically recast” in terms of the 
univocity of being (Oliver 2009: 21). For Aquinas, there is no being separate from God: Being is not 
an abstract concept posited as common to both. By contrast, the application of univocity to being 
implies that God and creation fall under a common genus: being. 
According to this model, often accredited to the work of the Franciscan John  Duns Scotus,
(c.1265-1308) the difference between God and man is simply that God possess more being than 
man. Yet because God’s is infinitely great, so to is the distance between God’s being and man’s: 
God has infinite Being in contrast to man. In this way, God slowly becomes sundered from 
creation, becoming a distant infinite power whose only recourse back to creation is through a 
dramatic intervention (Pickstock 1998: 121-125). This is a voluntarist God, who intervenes only 
through a concerted act of his will. 
Milbank’s point is quite simple: this theological sundering of God from creation is the basis 
of secular autonomy. In other words, where we take secularism to imply the loss of God, as if the 
choice were between God or no God, better to suggest two rival versions of the relationship: God – 
creation.
Accompanying this shift was change in the status of knowledge and representation. Under 
the scheme of analogy, knowing involved ontological elevation: we are known by reference to the 
divine, through elevation towards participation in God’s own knowledge, For example, our 
knowledge of tree is also a participation in the life of that tree. By contrast, when knowledge 
becomes representation, the process is more akin to taking a photograph: we do not know the 
subject as such, only the representation thereof. Herein lies the birth of modern scepticism. 
Moreover, as Oliver points out “because knowledge is now somewhat problematic, the focus for 
philosophy shifts from what we know […] to how we know” (Oliver 2009: 23); i.e. from ontology to 
epistemology. 
Taken together the shift from analogy to univocity, participation to representation, or 
ontology to epistemology, affects and supports the autonomy of the secular realm.  
What then of comedy? My argument is simple: Zupančič and Žižek’s comic theory remains 
within the scheme of univocity. So while on their anti-metaphysical thrust may suggest otherwise 
(e.g. the God they wish to banish is precisely the God of univocity – the principle sovereign 
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individual will, distant yet securing the whole, the big Other), as might their refusal of a reductive 
materialism, creation is rendered nonetheless an entirely autonomous sphere albeit never fully 
present to itself. This in turn accounts for the primacy they accord the social as the site of comedy. 
They fail to even consider the “Thomistic alternative” (Milbank 2009: 138). In place of Scotus’ being 
- possessed exceptionally so by God – we have instead its dialectical other: Void, the nihilist 
alternative. So where creation ex nihilo emphasises creation out of nothing, the dialectal shifts now 
determines, as Conor Cunningham puts it: the nothing as something (not unlike the deluded ghost 
who refuses to fully realise he is dead) (Cunningham 2002: xiii). 
In the second instance, Zupančič and Žižek treat comedy at the level of representation. 
This is clear from the formal framing of comedy within the Hegelian problematic of religious 
representation, and the way they employ the sublime as a category of aesthetics. 
V: Divine Comedy
So what of comedy from the perspective of analogy and participation?  G. K. Chesterton has 
already gone some way to suggesting just as much by linking comedy to paradox and paradox to 
analogy. Briefly put, the role of paradox (and hence comedy) in Chesterton’s work is part of a 
larger opening for analogical relations: 
“[the reader] must realize the first and simplist of the paradoxes that sit by the springs of 
truth. He must surely see that the fact of two things being different implies they are similar. 
The hare and the tortoise may differ in the quaility of swiftness, but they agree in the quality 
of motion. The swiftest hare cannot be swifter than an isoscelese triangle or the idea of 
pinkness. When we say the hare moves faster, we say that the tortoise moves…” 
(Chesterton 2007: 40)
As Alison Milbank points out (not to be confused with John Milbank at this point), analogy involves 
likeness in difference, and illustrates the way in which individual beings participate in being. “The 
result of this analogical way of thinking is a world that offers infinite opportunity as a network of 
analogies consisting in unity with difference, and hence infinite opportunity for paradox.”  (Milbank 
2007: 91)  And because being itself is analogical, all systematic thinking has a paradoxical cast. 
However, and in contrast to Žižek’s dialectics in which it can be said “the monstrosity of the 
apposition baulks thought and reveals the unkowable mystery [Real] of existence, it [analogy] 
leads to a moment of recognition beyond the contradictions in which the truth becomes manifest”. 
(Milbank 2007: 90). Chesterton develops paradox in a more “metaphysical and realist direction”. It 
does not merely present the coincidence of opposites by way of inversion; the truly paradoxical 
form is one in which a truth is “revealed in and through the contradiction” (Milbank 2007: 88). And 
as Alison Milbank puts it, having been presented with the paraodx, a reader “is presented with the 
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difference between two things, and seeks for that which unites them – their relation. Thus relation 
takes him or her back beyond the two contrasted things to their cause which is God.” (Milbank 
2007: 91). 
Chesterton was not the first to view comedy in this analogical way. Kierkegaard’s brilliant 
parodying of Hegel often masks what is at heart an analogical appreciation of comedy. For 
example, on the subject of wit he calls it “that Divine accident – an additional favour which comes 
as a sign from the gods, from the mysterious source of the inexplicable” (Kierkegaard 1962: 43). 
My reference to Chesterton and Kierkegaard is not incidental, it highlights John Milbank’s 
contention with Žižek: Žižek reads Chesterton – and one can add Kierkegaard here – as sub-
Hegelian; i.e. he recasts them within dialectics. Hence their resultant reading tends to stress the 
courage to confront the death-of-God, which invokes a moment of teleological suspension of the 
ethical, or in Zupančič and Žižek’s terms, a suspension of the big Other, but not the possible 
elevation of the soul as the necessary correlation of the materialist move (the genuine position of 
absurdity according to Kierkegaard); i.e. participation in the Divine Logos. In short, they are more 
correctly read in terms of analogy.     
Returning then to my initial questions, several points may be drawn out from the 
proceedings. First: what are the metaphysical presuppositions and shifts which facilitated the shift 
in comic theory so that it becomes avowedly anti-theological?  I have suggested that one account 
for this shift in the transition from analogy to univocity. 
In the second place, this accounts for the reduction of the field of comedy to the social: with 
the shift to univocity one can only speak of the world, and hence comedy without God. Only 
theology resists this reduction by positing the soul as the seat of comic elevation.
Thirdly, one should note the ethical implications of locating comedy within analogy and 
participation. Without such a framework, comedy easily lapses into a form of oppositional 
contradiction, and the laughter it provokes unbridled. By contrast, as Jacques Le Goff argues, 
following scholastic attempts to establish the casuistry of laughter (i.e. who laughs, what laughs, 
why laugh, and when to laugh?) we have the appearance of the hilaris dator, ‘the smiling donor’, 
attributed for example to Saint Francis of Assisi who admonished his brethren to remain hilaris  
vultu [‘of a joyful countenance’]. Laughter becomes a “manifestation of sainthood, a form of 
spirituality and comportment” (Le Goff 1997: 51). Similarly, the Latin tradition recognises the homo 
risibilis, the man ‘gifted with laughter. Both cases underline the link between comedy and gift. 
Theologically speaking, creation is ex nihilo [out of nothing]; i.e. it is the supreme gift, and 
the church a reciprocal community of gift. Linking comedy – understood analogically – to gift in this 
way ensures that the given is not reducible to trade goods; i.e. that Christian comedy plays a key 
role in the critique of capitalist exchange. Little wonder then that one of Christianity’s fiercest critics 
of liberal capitalism was also one of its most comic: Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard 1962). My wager 
then: comedy only attains this subversive edge to the extent it is understood analogically because 
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only analogy refuses the reduction of the world to the sphere of goods and the subject to the 
autonomous individual. 
Much of this may appear to hang on a naieve realist assumption, but the challenge is to ask 
whether the belief in the autonomy of the secular and the reduction of comedy to the social - over 
and against the religious - remains a genuine critical endeavor on the part of Zupančič and Žižek, 
or are merely the accentuation of modernist anti-theological trends which were themselves the 
result of bad theology.  
Conclusion
In sum I have made the case for a genealogical approach to comedy, to highlight the anti-
theological thrust at the heart of our modern accounts of comedy. Despite Zupančič and Žižek’s 
criticism of much comic theory in favour of a more radical Hegelian approach, their work fails to 
avoid a more generalised genealogical pull. While they draw upon the Christian legacy, they 
espouse a theology underpinned by univocity, which irrevocably leads comedy to close in upon the 
social gathering to which theology is ironically not invited. 
As for any derisory laughter on the part of the philosopher, it is no better than that of the 
jester or buffoon who laughs at the philosopher, baring his butt as if to embody the obscene 
underside of the situation. One can imagine for example a scene in which academics sit round and 
discuss in a highly abstract manner comic theory, only for a buffoon to burst in baring his butt and 
thereby expose the comedy of the very situation – the distance between the concept and the 
reality. What is intolerable to the jester is precisely the seriousness of the argument. And what this 
act veils is not only the possibility that reason may be the greatest mystery; but also that comedy 
itself might not stop at the butt, but run all the way up?
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1 While Zupančič is keen to highlight that her offering is a Hegelian theory of comedy as distinct from Hegel’s 
theory of comedy, it is helpful nonetheless to grasp something of Hegel’s attitudes to comedy, and more 
generally its social context. As Mary Towsend highlights, “the inhabitants of Prussia’s capital city had long 
prided themselves on their wit” to the extent “Guidebooks hailed Berlin as the “mother city of wit” (Townsend 
1997: 200). And Theodor Mundt, writing in 1844, described popular humour as the “Robespierre of the 
Berliners, their charter, their constitution, their everything” (Townsend 1997: 201). Townsend detects a social 
ambivalence of in the uses of humour, reflective of shifting patterns of social strata in Prussia during the 
transition from pre-revolutionary society to the time of Restoration. Reflecting on the Eckensteher Nante (a 
rough and tumble day labourer who appeared in various satirical and comedic narratives, plays, and 
caricature form), Townsend argues that in the pre-revolutionary society humour tended toward an un-
enlightened vulgarity and denigration of the lower strata, epitomised in the lampooning of the Eckensteher 
Nante. In this way, humour served to establish social demarcations – “us and them” in an age of social 
mobility. By contrast, in the time of Restoration one detects a shift as the Eckensteher becomes increasingly 
perceived as an embodiment of the German Volk, reflecting a middleclass desire to “unite all the people in 
opposition to the repressive Prussian State” (Townsend 1997: 216).
Hegel’s comments on comedy in his Lectures on Fine Art are exemplary of the latter 
approach. Consider for example his comments on the Dutch painters of the Seventeenth Century:  we have 
before us no vulgar feelings and passions but peasant life and down-to-earth life of the lower classes which 
is cheerful, roguish, and comic.” (Hegel 1975: 886-887).  Hegel goes on to distinguish the laughable from the 
comic. “The comical as such implies an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt by someone raised 
altogether above his own inner contradiction and not bitter or miserable in it at all” (Hegel 1975: 1200). 
Mark Roche has further argued for the centrality of the ‘comic’ in Hegel’s suggesting that “In 
a sense comedy functions as an aesthetic analogue to Hegel’s practice of immanent critique, by which the 
philosopher seeks to unveil self-contradictory and thus self-cancelling positions” (Roche 2002: 414-415).
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